

forces were reported to have suffered 50 per cent casualties. They would attempt to form a line at the Han River, but would fall back to a line above Taegu if necessary. Last reports were favorable for holding the Suwon air strip. (DA TT 3437) - - (TAB 1)

2. 6:56 a.m. -- In handing the Chinese reply to the U.S. aide-memoire to Charge Strong (Log, June 28, Entry 12) Foreign Minister Yeh expressed concern about "misconceptions" that might arise from the President's statement among the Formosans in view of the reference to a UN settlement, and among the Chinese who might see their hope of returning to the mainland dissipated. Yeh spoke of issuing a statement to show that the U.S. action was "permissive," unaware that Prime Minister Chen Cheng had already issued a statement. (Tel 1004) - - - - - (TAB 2)

3. 8:00 a.m. -- Mr. Rusk conveyed "last minute thoughts" to Ambassador Kirk before the latter's interview with Gromyko; the fact of North Korean aggression was clearly established; the Security Council resolutions were entirely legal, since by precedent absence of a permanent member did not constitute a veto; immediate withdrawal of North Korean forces followed by UN action for unification of Korea was the only practicable solution; the U.S. action in Korea aimed solely at support of the effort to maintain peace; the overwhelming response of the nations of the world in support of the UN action should suggest to the

USSR the

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE, A/CDC/MR

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REVIEWED BY

DATE 5/10/51

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June 29, 1950 (Continued)

USSR the desirability of using her influence to obtain a withdrawal of North Korean forces. (Tel 549) - - - - - (TAB 3)

4. 9:45 a.m. -- Counselor Drumright reported that General MacArthur had conferred with Ambassador Muccio and President Rhee on his visit to Korea, which it was "understood" would result in "momentous decisions". South Korean forces were regrouping and would have 25,000 men on the Han line, but it was highly doubtful that, even with U.S. air support, they would be able to hold there. (unnumbered Tel, Embassy Korea) - - - - - (TAB 4)

5. 11:10 a.m. -- The Australian Ambassador informed Secretary Acheson that his Government had decided to send the destroyer Bataan and the frigate Shoalhaven to Korea and would make available a squadron of F-51's if there were suitable airstrips for them in Korea. (Memo) - - - - - (TAB 5)

6. 1:02 p.m. -- Ambassador Kirk reported that Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko had read a statement to him placing responsibility for hostilities in Korea upon the South Korean authorities and "those who stand behind their back", asserting Soviet adherence to the principle of "the impermissibility of interference by foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea", and denying the legality of the action of the Security Council. (Tel 1767) - - - - - (TAB 6)

7. 2:30 p.m. -- Sir Derick Hoyer Millar, British Minister, telephoned Mr. Perkins that the British Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed to make representations to the Soviet Government along the same lines as those made by the American Embassy there. (Memo by Perkins) - - - - - (TAB 7)

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June 29, 1950 (Continued)

8. 4:30 p.m. -- The Chinese Ambassador presented an aide-memoire to Mr. Merchant containing the Chinese offer to send troops to Korea. Mr. Koo stated that 33,000 men were available but shipping would be needed, and added that in view of the urgency of the situation in Korea an approach was also being made to General MacArthur in Tokyo. (Memos by Merchant and Freeman.) - - - - - (TAB 8)

9. 5:00 p.m. -- The National Security Council met with the President and discussed a directive to General MacArthur on the use of American forces in Korea. The President said he wanted no suggestion included that we anticipated war with the Soviet Union. Secretary Johnson said that the language of the State Department's policy statement on this point (See Log, June 28, Entry 8) had been included. Secretary Acheson said that he agreed with the Defense Department's desire to authorize air operations against North Korea, though the orders should make it clear that Manchuria was to be avoided, and with Defense's suggestion to use land forces to maintain a beachhead in South Korea. He said that the State Department interpreted the Soviet reply to our note to mean that they would not commit their own forces in Korea. He asked whether fuller information could not be obtained from General MacArthur and the President said an order should be issued in his name directing General MacArthur to make a full report each day. The language of the directive governing use of U.S. forces (See below, Entry 10) was worked over by State and Defense representatives and approved by Secretaries Acheson and Johnson after the President left the meeting. (NSC Record of Action 309; Memo by Jessup.) - - - - - (TAB 9)



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June 29, 1950 (Continued)

10. 6:59 p.m. -- A Joint Chiefs of Staff directive to CINCPAC ordered him to use naval and air forces to support South Korean forces, to use army service and communication units only, except that combat units could be used to retain a port and air base in the general area Pusan-Chinhae. Attacks were authorized against purely military targets in North Korea, but such operations should "stay well clear of the frontiers of Manchuria or the Soviet Union." This commitment of U.S. forces did not constitute a decision to engage in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervened in Korea. If they did so, defensive action should be taken, but nothing should be done to aggravate the situation, and a report should be made to Washington. (JCS 84681 to CINCPAC) --- (TAB 10)

11. 8:48 p.m. -- USUN reported that Chauvel, the French delegate, had left with Ambassador Gross a paper in which he proposed that the Security Council be connected with the military action in Korea by undertaking to organize and coordinate the contributions of the member states. The paper suggested this task be assigned to the Military Staff Committee or to an ad hoc body made up either of Council members which had voted for the June 27 resolution or of UN members which were contributing military support. In a subsequent conversation British Delegate Sir Gladwyn Jebb expressed to Ambassador Austin strong disapproval of any use of the Military Staff Committee. Ambassador Austin informed him the Department was not much in favor of setting up such machinery. The delegations of Ecuador and Norway also applied to USUN for information as to how offers of military assistance would be handled, and were told that the problem was under study. (USUN Tel 561; USUN Memo by Ross, US/S/1270; USUN Memo by Noyes, US/S/1259) - - - - - (TAB 11)

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June 29, 1950 (Continued)

Other Actions, June 29

(Listed here are entries for which no exact time is available.)

12. USUN informed the Norwegian delegation that the American reaction to Indian Delegate Rau's suggestion of June 23 for a Security Council resolution inviting the U.S. and USSR to undertake discussions at the highest level was negative on the ground that it was inappropriate to give the impression the issue was between the U.S. and USSR. The issue now was between the UN and the Communist aggressors in North Korea. Mr. Noyes told Mr. Stabell of Norway that in his view the Department's reaction would be the same to a new proposal which the Indian delegate was considering, that the non-permanent members of the Security Council appeal to the U.S., UK, France, and the USSR to hold a high level meeting. Mr. Stabell said he agreed with the American attitude, as did Dr. Blanco of Cuba who discussed the matter in a separate conversation with Ambassador Gross. When Mr. Noyes was informed by Mr. Menon of the Indian delegation that a Security Council session had been called to make known India's position on the June 27 resolution, he did not mention any intention to bring up Rau's proposal for a high level meeting between the U.S. and USSR.

(USUN Memos by Noyes, US/S/1266 and 1267.) - - - - - (TAB 12)

13. UN representatives of Australia, Belgium, China, The Netherlands, and New Zealand informed the Secretary General that their Governments were prepared to provide assistance to the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Security Council resolution of June 27. (Security Council Documents) - - - - - (TAB 13)

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June 29, 1950 (Continued)

14. The USSR and Czechoslovakia informed the Secretary General that they regarded the Security Council resolution of June 27 as without legal force in view of the absence of two permanent members, the USSR and China. (Security Council Documents) - - - - -

(TAB 14)

15. The Security Council received a report dated June 24 submitted by field observers to the UN Commission on Korea. The observers stated after an inspection of South Korean forces along the 38th parallel that these forces were "organized entirely for defense" and were "in no condition to carry out attack on large scale against forces of north." (Security Council Document) - - - - -

(TAB 15)

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June 29, 1950 (Continued)

Annexes

(Background and collateral material)

- A. Memo by Mr. Rusk, "Three Policy Thoughts". (The substance of this was presumably conveyed orally to the Secretary before the NSC meeting of this date.) - - - - - (TAB A)
- B. "Special Guidance on Korea, No. 6" by P. - - - - - (TAB B)
- C. "International Economic Relations of the North Korean Regime", DRF No. 192. - - - - - (TAB C)
- D. "Reactions in Latin America to US and UN Decisions Regarding the Events in Korea", DRA-IP 142. - - - - - (TAB D)
- E. "World Reaction to President's Statement, No. 2" by OIR. - - (TAB E)
- F. "Pyongyang Radio Propaganda Summary", IP-344. - - - - - (TAB F)
- G. Memorandum on the President's Press Conference, No. 19. - - - (TAB G)
- H. Address by the Secretary of State before the convention of the American Newspaper Guild. - - - - - (TAB H)

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Summary of Actions and Decisions - June 30, 1950.

(All entries are in EDT; on incoming telegrams the time of receipt is used.)

1. 1:31 a.m. -- The Political Adviser in Tokyo reported a telephone conversation with Ambassador Muccio concerning a conference held by Muccio, President Rhee, and General MacArthur. Muccio recommended in the strongest terms full support of a "bold plan" that would be recommended by MacArthur to the JCS and said that an all-out effort was necessary if the situation were to be saved." (Tel 682) - - - - - (TAB 1)

2. 1:31 a.m. -- General MacArthur reported on his personal inspection of the South Korean battle area from Suwon north to the Han River. He concluded: "The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of U.S. ground combat forces into the Korean battle area." He said that, if authorized, he intended to move one American regimental combat team immediately "to the reinforcement of the vital area...and to provide for a possible build-up to a two division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive." (Army Message C-56942) - (TAB 2)

3. 3:40 a.m. -- In a tele-conference between General Collins and staff (Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bond present for State) and General MacArthur and staff, the latter requested a "clear-cut decision" as to whether he could be authorized to move one RCT to the combat area. General Collins replied that this would require a Presidential decision and suggested that the movement of troops be started under the directive of the previous day (Log, June 29, Entry 10). General MacArthur replied that this directive did not

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